Plato, Republic 1.354b

The first book of the Republic reaches an impasse. Socrates blames himself.

ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ οἱ λίχνοι τοῦ ἀεὶ παραφερομένου ἀπογεύονται ἁρπάζοντες, πρὶν τοῦ προτέρου μετρίως ἀπολαῦσαι, καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ οὕτω, πρὶν ὃ τὸ πρῶτον ἐσκοποῦμεν εὑρεῖν, τὸ δίκαιον ὅτι ποτ’ ἐστίν, ἀφέμενος ἐκείνου ὁρμῆσαι ἐπὶ τὸ σκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ εἴτε κακία ἐστὶν καὶ ἀμαθία, εἴτε σοφία καὶ ἀρετή, καὶ ἐμπεσόντος αὖ ὕστερον λόγου, ὅτι λυσιτελέστερον ἡ ἀδικία τῆς δικαιοσύνης, οὐκ ἀπεσχόμην τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐλθεῖν ἀπ’ ἐκείνου, ὥστε μοι νυνὶ γέγονεν ἐκ τοῦ διαλόγου μηδὲν εἰδέναι.

But just as gluttons grab at every dish that’s served and taste it before they’ve had the full enjoyment of the previous one, so I too (I think), before finding out what was the first matter for us to consider – what justice is – let go of that and rushed into considering something about it – whether it is vice and ignorance or wisdom and virtue – and again later on, when the argument fell upon us that injustice is more profitable than justice, I could not restrain myself from going away from this topic to the other one, so that what has come out of the discussion now for me is that I know nothing.

Plato, Menexenus 238c-d

Socrates on democracy:

καλεῖ δὲ ὁ μὲν αὐτὴν δημοκρατίαν, ὁ δὲ ἄλλο, ᾧ ἂν χαίρῃ, ἔστι δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μετ’ εὐδοξίας πλήθους ἀριστοκρατία. βασιλῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ ἡμῖν εἰσιν· οὗτοι δὲ τοτὲ μὲν ἐκ γένους, τοτὲ δὲ αἱρετοί.

One man calls it ‘democracy’, but another calls it something else, as the fancy takes him. In truth it is an aristocracy supported by the approval of the public. For we always have kings; at one time they are so by heredity, at another time by election.

Plato, Symposium 185d-e

It’s Aristophanes’ turn to make a speech, but he’s been overcome by hiccups. Doctor Eryximachus steps in to speak, but not before offering his medical advice:

ἐν ᾧ δ’ ἂν ἐγὼ λέγω, ἐὰν μέν σοι ἐθέλῃ ἀπνευστὶ ἔχοντι πολὺν χρόνον παύεσθαι ἡ λύγξ· εἰ δὲ μή, ὕδατι ἀνακογχυλίασον. εἰ δ’ ἄρα πάνυ ἰσχυρά ἐστιν, ἀναλαβών τι τοιοῦτον οἵῳ κινήσαις ἂν τὴν ῥῖνα, πτάρε· καὶ ἐὰν τοῦτο ποιήσῃς ἅπαξ ἢ δίς, καὶ εἰ πάνυ ἰσχυρά ἐστι, παύσεται.

And while I’m speaking, if you would hold your breath for some time, the hiccups will stop. But if they don’t, gargle with water. And if the hiccups are still just as strong, take hold of something to tickle your nose with and sneeze: if you sneeze once or twice even the strongest hiccups will be stopped.

Plato, Phaedrus 279b-c

Socrates gives an example of a Socratic prayer.

ὦ φίλε Πάν τε καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇδε θεοί, δοίητέ μοι καλῷ γενέσθαι τἄνδοθεν· ἔξωθεν δὲ ὅσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναί μοι φίλια. πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν· τὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πλῆθος εἴη μοι ὅσον μήτε φέρειν μήτε ἄγειν δύναιτο ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σώφρων.

O dear Pan and as many other gods as are here, grant that I may become beautiful within, and that what I possess externally may be in harmony with what is within. May I consider wisdom to be wealth, and may I have just as much gold as no one other than a moderate person could bear and carry.

Plato, Socrates’ Defence Speech 21d

Here is part of Plato’s version of the speech that Socrates gave at his trial (often called his ‘apology’, an archaic use of the word which is misleading in its modern sense, since the speech is far from ‘apologetic’). After recalling an encounter with an unnamed politician, Socrates reflects on his realisation that neither of them could be called wise.

κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι, ἀλλ’ οὗτος μὲν οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι· ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι.

It seems likely that neither of us knows anything good and beautiful; but he thinks he knows something, although he doesn’t know it, whereas I don’t know anything and don’t think that I do. So, in this one little way at least, it seems that I am wiser: I don’t think that I know the things which I don’t know.